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Technology-based companies compete among themselves not
only for rights to the latest razor-thin advance in a given scientific
field, but also for the more mundane, but equally essential custom-
ers and employees. Competition for the best and brightest workers
and the relative ease of new entries in many segments of the indus-
try have caused legitimate concern among employers who want to
protect their staffs and customer goodwill from "raiding" by former
employees who have left to form or join a competing enterprise.
California is remarkable among the states in the solicitious atti-
tude of its legislature and judiciary toward the right of individuals
to pursue the American Dream. This philosophy is reflected in part
in Business and Professions Code § 16600, which invalidates all
contracts that restrain a person's ability to earn a livelihood. Like
most policies, however, this one is subject to exceptions, and em-
ployers have attempted over the years to create enforceable non-
competition covenants against their former employees. These
efforts have met with mixed, but mostly negative, results.
An alternative and less drastic measure used by employers to
protect against competition by ex-employees is a covenant restrict-
ing solicitation of customers and employees for a period of time fol-
lowing employment. This approach has been more generally
accepted, since it seeks to satisfy the employer's legitimate needs in
a more focused fashion that, in the view of most courts, does not
inappropriately interfere with an employee's rights.
In this article we will examine recent decisional law affecting
noncompetition and nonsolicitation employee covenants. We will
attempt to analyze critically the recent decisions, looking for trends
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and guideposts, and suggesting approaches that might be used in
formulating enforceable restrictions.
II. NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
Business and Professions Code §§ 16600-166021 is the statu-
tory embodiment of California's policy declaring unenforceable
contracts which limit one's right to pursue a trade or profession.
California differs from the majority rule2 which upholds restrictive
employee covenants if they are found by the courts to be "reason-
able" in subject matter, duration, and territorial coverage.
The difference in perspective is a real one, as illustrated in the
case of Frame v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.3
There the former employee of a New York Stock Exchange member
firm complained of a provision in his employment contract which
caused a forfeiture of benefits in the event that he left to work for a
competitor. The agreement called for application of the law of the
State of New York, where the brokerage firm had its headquarters.
The California court identified its own state's significant policy in-
terest in the question, refused to apply New York law, and invali-
dated the forfeiture clause as contrary to Business and Professions
Code § 16600.
Despite the California courts' antipathy toward noncompeti-
tion covenants, their potential effectiveness as a means of post-ter-
1. The complete text of California Business and Professions Code §§ 16600 and 16601
are as follows:
§ 16600. Unauthorized contracts
Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is re-
strained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is
to that extent void.
§ 16601. Sale of goodwill or corporate shares
Any person who sells the goodwill of a business, or any shareholder of a corpo-
ration selling or otherwise disposing of all his shares in said corporation, or any
shareholder of a corporation which sells (a) all or substantially all of its operat-
ing assets together with the goodwill of the corporation, (b) all or substantially
all of the operating assets of a division or a subsidiary of the corporation to-
gether with the goodwill of such division or subsidiary, or (c) all of the shares
of any subsidiary, may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a simi-
lar business within a specified county or counties, city or cities, or a part
thereof, in which the business so sold, or that of said corporation, division, or
subsidiary has been carried on, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving
title to the goodwill or shares from him, carries on a like business therein. For
the purposes of this section, "subsidiary" shall mean any corporation, a major-
ity of whose voting shares are owned by the selling corporation.
2. See REST. CONTRACTS 2d, § 188, 45-47; Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Com-
pete, 73 HARV. L.R. 625 (1960).
3. 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971).
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mination control of an ex-employee's activities has led California
employers to devise creative employment agreements meant to sat-
isfy the exact terms of the statute (if ignoring the policy which un-
derlies it). We will now turn to a recent opinion in which such an
approach was successfully challenged.
A. Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson4
L.P. Lee Bosley, M.D., founder and president of the Bosley
Medical Group, had established a practice specializing in hair trans-
plantation and male pattern reduction surgery. Abramson was an
experienced physician practicing cosmetic facial surgery and mak-
ing about $80,000 a year. Bosley solicited him to join the practice,
telling him he could make a million dollars over five years. Abram-
son accepted and began working with Bosley's organization in May
1980. After two weeks, Bosley presented him with an "independent
contractor agreement" and told him that he would have to sign it
and a stock purchase agreement in order to remain with the firm.
The stock purchase agreement obligated Abramson to buy 9%
of the stock in Bosley's corporation for $10,000, which would be
paid by a promissory note. It also included a provision that, upon
termination of employment, Abramson would sell and Bosley
would buy back the same shares at the same price, plus 10% per
year. Finally, the contract included a noncompetition clause
prohibiting Abramson from engaging in a similar practice within
designated counties for a three year period after termination.
Abramson's earnings (apparently set by Bosley) did reach the
predicted level, but Bosley himself kept most of what the business
generated. During the two years Abramson remained with the Bos-
ley group, Bosley (who retained 73% of the stock) paid himself over
$800,000 per year, leaving distributable profits of $20,000-450,000
per year for the remaining shareholders. Abramson's profit share
each year, in the form of dividends, was less than the interest pay-
ment on his promissory note.
At the end of 1982, Abramson had acquired a great deal of
experience in the medical technique practiced by Bosley. As of the
time he arrived, he had performed only one scalp reduction and
approximately 10 hair transplants. When he left to open his own
competing practice, he advertised that he had completed more than
75,000 grafts and 450 scalp reductions.
Bosley sought and was granted a preliminary injunction en-
4. 161 Cal. App. 3d 284, 207 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1984).
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forcing the noncompetition covenant. On appeal from the order,
the court of appeal reversed, holding that the agreement was "a
sham devised to circumvent our state policy against agreements
which prevent the practice of a business or profession ....
In a brief review of the history behind Business and Professions
Code § 16600, the court noted that California's rule was atypical:
Although at common law and in many states, a restraint on the
practice of a trade or occupation, even as applied to a former
employee, is valid if reasonable [citations], the so-called rule of
reasonableness was rejected by this state in 1872. That year Civil
Code sections 1673-1675 - the predecessor sections to Business
and Professions Code §§ 16600-16602 - were enacted. At least
since 1872, a noncompetition agreement has been void unless
specifically authorized by section 16601 or 16602.6
The court observed that, until 1945, only a partner in a dissolv-
ing partnership or one who sold all the goodwill in a business could
enter into an enforceable agreement not to compete. In that year,
the legislature amended the section to apply to a "shareholder" who
sold "all his shares." It was this language on which Bosley relied in
seeking enforcement of his agreement with Abramson.
However, the court examined the legislative history of the 1945
amendment to determine whether the statute was susceptible of
such a literal interpretation, and concluded that it was not. Quoting
from a letter and memorandum to the relevant committee from one
of the legislators who had sponsored the bill, the court noted that
the benefits of the change in the law were intended primarily for the
stockholder in relatively small corporations... where the cus-
tomers have become used to and appreciate the personal service
of the vendor stockholder... " In brief, the purpose of the 1945
amendment was to permit the "owner" of a small corporation to
agree not to compete in connection with selling his entire interest
in that corporation [so that he could achieve a fair price for the
business]. 7
Based on this analysis, the court concluded that the statute was
intended to permit noncompetition agreements "only in situations
in which the transfer of 'all' of the owner's shares involves a sub-
stantial interest in the corporation so that the owner, in transfering
'all' of his shares, can be said to transfer the goodwill of the corpo-
5. Id. at 288, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
6. Id. at 288, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
7. Id. at 290, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
254 [Vol. 4
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ration."8 The literal interpretation argued by Bosley, the court
pointed out, could easily lead to "mischievous and absurd" results.
"Literally applied, Section 16601 would permit a major public cor-
poration to require any employee to purchase one of several million
shares and to enter into an agreement not to work for a
competitor."9
Bosley had argued that the purpose of the stock transaction, as
recited in the documents, was to provide an "incentive" to Abram-
son, and to "achieve a professional relationship." On the latter
point, the court observed that control of the relationship was as-
sured by the strict standards of conduct in the "independent con-
tractor agreement" and by its provision allowing Bosley to
terminate Abramson on five days' notice.10 As to the former, it was
hardly appropriate to call this agreement an "incentive," the court
explained, given its mandatory nature and the hopeless prospects
for any real gain on the "investment."'" Because the transaction
was artificial, with Bosley maintaining effectively complete control,
the court concluded that it was a sham, "devised to permit plaintiffs
to accomplish that which the law otherwise prohibited: an agree-
ment to prevent defendant from leaving plaintiff medical group and
opening a competitive practice."' 2
The Bosley case is significant in part because it is the first ap-
pellate opinion to address the "sham" model which, in the author's
experience, has been used by a number of other California employ-
ers in recent years (although typically with more substance to the
transaction than the Bosley design). It is also the first case to ad-
dress the applicability of Business and Professions Code § 16601 to
a truly "minority" shareholder. In virtually every other case de-
cided under this statute, the selling shareholder has been the indi-
vidual "owner," or described as one of only a few "owners," of a
relatively small business. 3
8. Id.




13. Conway v. Bughouse, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 194, 164 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1980) (half
owner); Monogram Industries, Inc. v. SAR Industries, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 692, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 714 (1977) (two-thirds owner); Macken v. Martinez, 214 Cal. App. 2d 784, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 867 (1963) (two-partner partnership); Kaplan v. Nalpak Corp., 158 Cal. App. 2d 197,
322 P.2d 226 (1958) (one-half shareholder); Bramwell v. Airport Blueprint Co., 154 Cal.
App. 2d 57, 315 P.2d 360 (1957) (sole owner); Kay v. Tellsen, 129 Cal. App. 2d 115, 276 P.2d
611 (1954) (sole proprietor); Handyspot Co. v. Buegeleisen, 128 Cal. App. 2d 191, 274 P.2d
938 (1954) (sole proprietor); Martinez v. Martinez, 41 Cal. 2d 704, 263 P.2d 617 (1953) (sale
of business branch by one brother to another); Mahlstedt v. Fugit, 79 Cal. App. 2d 562, 180
55
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B. Mandatory Employee Stock Purchase Agreements
In the face of Bosley, is it possible to require employees to ac-
quire stock in the employer company, subject to a repurchase at
some point in the future, which in turn will support a noncompeti-
tion clause? Before we address the theoretical question, it is impor-
tant to recall that the statute requires that the selling shareholder
subject to the noncompetition clause sell "all" of his shares. Pursu-
ant to most employee stock acquisition agreements, the absolute
right to retain the shares will typically "vest" in increments over a
period of time. The question we have posed, then, assumes that one
can find prospective employees who are otherwise sufficiently com-
pensated so that they would be willing to enter into a contract re-
quiring a resale of all their stock at termination.
The factors which affected the Bosley court's decision included
the mandatory nature of the purchase, the lack of any realistic bene-
fit that might flow to the employee, and the fact that the stated
purpose ("incentive") made no sense. 4
These problems could be overcome in a hypothetical transac-
tion in which, for example, the employer simply granted stock to
the employee, subject to a repurchase at some price tied to perform-
ance, such as aggregate earnings over time. This approach would
provide some real incentive, while still giving the employer an op-
portunity to control the amount eventually paid for the stock. Dis-
tribution of profits should typically not be an issue in most closely
held firms, which reinvest their earnings. In any event, it is safe to
assume that the Bosley court was more influenced by the lack of any
real investment objective than by the circumstances of Dr. Bosley's
retaining control over the corporation.
The practical problems inherent in creating an enforceable post
employment noncompetition agreement at the outset of the rela-
P.2d 177 (1947) (sole owner); General Paint Corp. v. Seymour, 124 Cal. App. 611, 12 P.2d
990 (1932) (sale by both owners); Graca v. Rodriques, 33 Cal. App. 296, 165 P. 1012 (1917)
(sole owner); Johnston v. Blanchard, 16 Cal. App. 321, 116 P. 973 (1911) (two co-owners);
Shafer v. Sloan, 3 Cal. App. 335, 85 P. 162 (1906) (sole owner); Potter v. Ahrens, 110 Cal.
674, 43 P. 388 (1896) (husband and wife owners); Gregory v. Spieker, 110 Cal. 150, 42 P. 576
(1895) (sale of exclusive right to manufacture and market by sole owner); Ragsdale v. Nagle,
106 Cal. 332, 39 P. 628 (1895) (sole owner); Brown v. Kling, 101 Cal. 295, 35 P. 995 (1894)
(sale by both owners); City Carpet-Beating, Etc., Works v. Jones, 102 Cal. 506, 36 P. 841
(1894) (sole owner); Prior v. Diggs, 3 Cal. Unrep. 65, 31 P. 155 (1892) (sole owner).
14. The defendant had raised other defenses - adequacy of consideration and alleged
duress in execution of the documents - which the court did not need to address in view of its
determination on the validity of the restraint. However, it is useful to keep in mind that
Business and Professions Code § 16600 is only one of several hurdles that a restrictive cove-
nant might have to clear in order to achieve enforceability.
[Vol. 4
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tionship are so pervasive that we are unlikely to face the issue fre-
quently. But such covenants are relatively common in connection
with mergers and acquisitions, in which a number of employees of
the acquired company part with all their stock and are required to
execute a contemporaneous noncompetition agreement. Are such
contracts enforceable against all employees who sign them?
One issue that was not articulated fully in Bosley was the na-
ture of the employee's ownership interest, as reflective of his ability
to influence the disposition of the company's assets. After all, a
primary justification for the exception codified in Business and Pro-
fessions Code § 16601 is that the seller of a business is uniquely
positioned to divert to himself the very assets which he has just sold
to the buyer. This idea seems easily straightforward in the business
environment existing when the statute was first enacted; most enter-
prises were small by today's standards, and the typical firm was
owned by the person who ran it.
The statutory assumption has been that it is not "fair" for a
selling owner to compromise the value of that which he has sold.
Viewed from the historical perspective, the statute therefore also
assumes that the person sought to be restrained has had some influ-
ence on whether the business would be sold and on what terms.
Stated another way, it would also not be "fair" to permit someone
without a significant degree of control to be restrained. Otherwise,
a prior agreement to sell back a minority ownership might be used
as the platform for a squeeze-out by the majority that would leave
the former minority stockholder unfairly disadvantaged.
Applying this approach to today's employee-stockholder, the
statute should apply to uphold a noncompetition covenant when the
extent of the employee's holdings are such that the conclusion is
fairly compelled that he could exercise substantial influence over
the terms of a sale of a business. Conversely, in cases where the
percentage ownership is quite small, enforcement should be denied
absent proof of other circumstances demonstrating that the em-
ployee was part of a group with significant control over the enter-
prise. As the Bosley court pointed out, a literal interpretation of the
statute can lead 'to absurd and mischievous results. Since we are
dealing here with a statute meant to effectuate an important public
policy, it should be implemented in a way that is consistent with its
underlying assumptions. In practical terms, the noncompetition
agreement should find scarce application in California to employees
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4WJOURN4L
who are not part of the first level of a company's management.15
III. NONSOLICITATION AGREEMENTS
A. The Nature of the Restrictions and California Policy
Under Sections 16600-16602.
As we have seen in our analysis of Bosley Medical Group v.
Abramson, agreements that expressly limit the sort of business that
one can pursue are void unless predicated on specific, narrow statu-
tory exceptions. 16 A lesser form of restriction commonly found in
employment agreements seeks not to restrain the employee's ability
to compete, but rather to "delimit" how that competition may be
conducted. Of course, the distinction is more easily stated than
achieved. A number of California court opinions deal with agree-
ments restricting an employee's right to use information gained dur-
ing the term of employment, or to solicit customers or employees of
the former employer. Often the courts have struck down or se-
verely limited such covenants through interpretation, in an effort to
square them with the policy underlying Business and Professions
Code § 16600; that is, to prevent the employer from achieving
through indirection what it could not do directly. This portion of
the article will focus on the nonsolicitation covenant, which has
been the subject of several recent California appellate decisions.
In reviewing these opinions, it will be useful to understand the
background of case law against which they were written. The gen-
eral rule, articulated by cases such as Aetna Building Maintenance
Co. v. West 17 and Bancroft- Whitney Co. v. Glen,1 8 is that the Cali-
fornia employee is entitled to leave and compete with his former
employer, so long as no trade secrets are used, and so long as the
employee meets any fiduciary obligations imposed upon him by vir-
tue of any special position of trust.
In general, then, a former employee is privileged to accept the
business of a former employer's customers or clients, and to hire its
employees. It is just as clear that the employer is entitled to protec-
tion against the former employee's misappropriation of its confiden-
tial business information that might be used to give him an unfair
advantage in obtaining customers or employees. Depending on the
15. The same analysis may be applied to a nonmanagerial "partner" in a large organiza-
tion, whose real status in practical terms is closer to that of an employee. See, eg., Caruso v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 644 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
16. Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson, supra note 2, at 291, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
17. 39 Cal. 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11 (1952).
18. 64 Cal. 2d 327, 411 P.2d 921, 49 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1966).
[Vol. 4
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nature of the business, the employer's list of "preferred" customers
and information concerning their needs and preferences may consti-
tute the most valuable sort of trade secret. In other cases an em-
ployee may be left free to solicit in an industry where the customers
are all well known and dispense their patronage based on objective
criteria such as price and quality of goods.
An issue that finds a great deal of play in recent cases is the
role of the employment contract in such situations. Given the
strong public policy which underlies Business and Professions Code
§ 16600, the courts will examine carefully any contract which ap-
pears to restrict an ex-employee's ability to earn a living in his cho-
sen profession. But because the cases in this area are determined
largely by principles of equity, and because the results are very fact-
driven, the existence of a contract that acknowledges the employer's
"proprietary rights" to information concerning its customers and
employees may have a significant effect on the outcome. Thus,
where the technical matters in issue are extremely complex, and a
departing officer is caught in what appears to be an egregious viola-
tion of his fiduciary responsibilities, the courts may turn to his em-
ployment contract as defining the parties' rights and responsibilities
concerning trade secrets. 9
On the other hand, some cases appear to state a definitive rule
that the parties to a contract cannot by their agreement make a
protectable trade secret what the law would not otherwise treat as
such.2 0 Picking up on this concept, more recent decisions, includ-
ing one of the opinions that will be examined in depth here, have
concluded that the parties to an employment contract are powerless
to bargain for any restrictions that would not be available to the
employer under common law and equitable principles, in the ab-
sence of any contract.21
Several recent California appellate decisions have examined
and commented upon these principles, seeking to confirm, clarify or
constrict them. The results have been uneven. In the remainder of
this article, we will attempt to critique these decisions and synthe-
size a set of rules that is consistent with the results obtained and
prior decisional law.
19. Daniel Orifice Fitting Co. v. Whalen, 198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 797-98, 18 Cal. Rptr.
659 (1962). See also Ingrassia v. Bailey, 172 Cal. App. 2d 117, 124, 341 P.2d 370, 375 (1959).
20. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Dempster, 174 Cal. App. 2d 418, 425,
344 P.2d 821, 825-26 (1959).
21. Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1338, 1340 (9th
Cir. 1980); Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling, 179 Cal. App. 3d 124, 130, 224 Cal. Rptr. 456
(1986).
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B. American Paper & Packaging Products, Inc. v. Kirgan22
The defendant salesmen had signed written agreements with
the plaintiff containing a restriction against "calling on or solicit-
ing" any customer which the salesmen had called on or become
acquainted with or learned of during their employment, the restric-
tion to continue for three years after termination. The contract also
prohibited disclosure to any third party, during the same period, of
names, addresses, telephone numbers, or any other information
about these customers. All customer lists were to be surrendered at
termination.
After a dispute arose over commissions, the defendants were
terminated, and then went to work for a competitor. Plaintiff
sought an injunction enforcing the restrictions of the contract. De-
fendants denied that any customer information was ever given to
them by plaintiff (except for three specific customers), and detailed
the "cold-calling" method they had used to develop their current
business, using only public sources of information.
Defendants argued that the business was very sensitive to
price, quality of product and speed of delivery, and that loyal rela-
tionships did not exist, customers typically ordering such material
from more than one company at a time. Plaintiff argued that suc-
cess depended on understanding the particular needs of the cus-
tomer, and that 95% of its customers had given them repeat
business.
A requested injunction was denied by the trial court, and the
court of appeal affirmed on the basis that the information was read-
ily available, while holding as a preliminary matter that a customer
list can qualify as a trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act ("UTSA"). 23 The court also noted that the "five-prong" test of
Aetna 24 and the "three-prong" test of Hollingsworth 25 were promul-
22. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 228 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1986).
23. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3246 (Deering 1984). The
American Paper court distinguished the case of Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling, 179 Cal. App.
3d 124, 274 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986) (which had recently found a list of customer names not to
qualify as a trade secret) as considering the use of customer lists "in a different context," and
concluded that it "did not deal squarely with the issue presented here." The Moss, Adams
case is considered infra at 276-280.
24. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 19, at 1332-34: "[1] whether the information is readily accessible to
a reasonably diligent competitor... [2] whether the customer's decision to purchase is influ-
enced primarily by considerations such as price, quality, reliable delivery, and efficient ser-
vice, as contrasted with considerations such as special needs or effort, has knowledge...
[3] whether, in addition to manifesting an intent to take business away from the plaintiff, the
salesman or competitor has a purpose to injure the plaintiff's business."
[Vol. 4
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gated before the enactment of the UTSA, which now controls the
definition of a trade secret.2 6 Using the broader statutory definition,
a list of the type developed by plaintiff could qualify. However, the
court pointed out, plaintiffs must still prove that the list (1) derives
independent value from not being generally known and (2) was and
is the subject of reasonable protection efforts.27
In arguing that it had met its burden of showing the value of
the information, the employer referred to language of the employ-
ment contract, which contained a recital that "the foregoing mat-
ters are important, material, and confidential and gravely affect the
effective and successful conduct of the business . "..."28 Rejecting
this argument, the court explained:
Appellant's reliance on the language of the employee agreements
is not helpful. An agreement between employer and employee
defining a trade secret may not be decisive in determining
whether the court will so regard it.29
Moreover, the court reasoned, the contractual recitals to the
effect that a large body of useful data had been made available to
the defendants by plaintiff were expressly denied by defendants, and
on review they were entitled to the most favorable interpretation of
the evidence."0 Viewing the evidence in this fashion, the court con-
cluded that in this particular business, all competitors knew who
the potential customers were, and to the extent that they might
know the precise identification, it was "readily ascertainable" by the
"cold-calling" process described by the defendants. 3
The impact of American Paper is somewhat limited, since it
arose on appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction. Be-
cause factual issues on conflicting points are resolved in favor of the
respondent, virtually anything that the defendant had presented to
negative the showing of the plaintiff would have carried the day.
Therefore, it would be a mistake to read out of context the court's
comment that the contractual language was "not helpful." Cer-
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (Deering 1984) provides: "Trade secret" means infor-
mation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process, that (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.
27. American Paper & Packaging Prod. v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 1324, 228
Cal. Rptr. 713, 716.
28. Id. at 1325, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
29. Id
30. Id. at 1326, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
31. Id.
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tainly in a trial court the recitals of an otherwise valid employment
agreement have evidentiary significance.32 However, as reflected in
this decision, any presumption created by such recitals is easily
rebutted.
In commenting on the qualifications of the plaintiff's customer
list as a trade secret, the court observed that the information was
"readily ascertainable" since the "compilation process in this case is
neither sophisticated nor difficult nor particularly time consum-
ing.",33 Unfortunately, the opinion does not reflect exactly how
much time and sophistication would be required to create an
equivalent list. Certainly it should not be read to hold that simply
because a compilation can be made through use of publicly avail-
able information, it is "readily available." Indeed, the California
version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act reflects a particular con-
cern about precisely this question.
The language of the Uniform Act requires that the plaintiff
prove that the value of the information at issue is derived "from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use."' 34 This section was changed in enacting
the California statute to read "from not being generally known to
the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use."'35 Dropping the phrase "readily ascertain-
able" was proposed by the California State Bar in reaction to an
Indiana case which held that a list of insurance policyholders and
related information could not qualify as a trade secret because it
could have been compiled from interviewing the policyholders.36
However, the change did not eliminate the "readily ascertainable"
standard, but only removed it from the definition of a "trade secret"
that the plaintiff must prove, thereby shifting the burden of proof;
official comments to the enactment make it clear that the defendant
may present evidence on the issue.37
It seems reasonable that the American Paper court saw in this
case a compilation process that was unsophisticated and not partic-
ularly time consuming, and inferred - consistently with the re-
32. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1639 (Deering 1971).
33. American Paper & Packaging Prod. v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1326, 228 Cal.
Rptr. at 717.
34. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 541, 542 (1980).
35. See supra note 24.
36. See Pooley, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: California Civil Code Section 3426, 1 S.
C. COMP. & H. TECH. L. J. 193, 198-99 (1985).
37. Id.
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quirement to view the evidence most favorably to the respondent -
that all companies in this industry had developed basically the same
"list." It then followed, the court reasoned, that because this infor-
mation is already in use "by good faith competitors, it is not a pro-
tectable trade secret."'3 ' Here again, however, the language used by
the court must be viewed in context, and it should not be read as
saying that simply because a plurality of companies within an in-
dustry possess the same information, it cannot be a trade secret as
to those that have it39 (unless it becomes, as it seems to have become
here, notoriously open and widespread).
A final note of unnecessary uncertainty was injected by the
court through its reference to what it called the "five prong test" of
Aetna and the "three prong test" of Hollingsworth.' The language
in the opinion suggests that Aetna and Hollingsworth set down stan-
dards which have been rejected by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
putting the viability of their holdings in question. However, an ex-
amination of the cited cases demonstrates that, properly construed,
they remain good law.
In Aetna Building Maintenance Co. v. West,41 the California
Supreme Court reversed a decision in favor of the former employer
plaintiff arising from the alleged solicitation of its customers. In
finding that the facts would not warrant imposition of liability, the
Court identified five factors as critical to the granting of relief in
customer list cases: (1) the information is confidential and not read-
ily accessible to competitors; (2) the former employee solicited cus-
tomers with an intent to injure the plaintiff; (3) the former employee
sought out "preferred customers" not generally known to the trade;
(4) the industry is characterized by single sources of supply; and
(5) the customer relationship would normally continue unless inter-
fered with.42
The Aetna court found that none of those factors *.ere present
in the case before it, and neglected to explain whether it intended
the list to be expressed in the disjunctive, or as a requirement that
plaintiff meet all five "tests" before relief would be available. The
former explanation was suggested as the clearly preferred one in a
law review article which has since been cited frequently on the sub-
38. American Paper & Packaging Prod. v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1326, 228 Cal.
Rptr. at 718.
39. See 12 Business Organizations, Milgrimn On Trade Secrets § 2.07[2].
40. Id at 1324, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
41. Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, supra note 15.
42. Id. at 204, 246 P.2d at 15.
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ject.43 The same view was stated by the court in Hollingsworth.'
As to the three primary "factors" identified in Hollingsworth,45
the court specifically stated that it was relating considerations
"which California courts have found relevant," but did not intend
"an exhausted compilation."'46 Therefore, it is not appropriate to
view either Aetna or Hollingsworth as presenting a strict "test" with
any number of "prongs," and the equitable considerations identified
by the courts in those opinions continue to be important under the
formulation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.47
C. Loral Corporation v. Moyes48
Moyes (an officer of a Loral subsidiary) had signed a termina-
tion agreement with Loral that provided continued salary for a pe-
riod of time, as well as other benefits. It also contained a promise
that Moyes would "not now or in the future disrupt, damage, im-
pair or interfere with the business of [the company] whether by way
of interfering with or raiding its employees, disrupting its relation-
ships with customers, agents, representatives or vendors or
otherwise."49
As soon as he left Loral, Moyes joined a competitor, where "he
then breached the agreement by offering employment with his new
employer to two key [former] employees ...Ultimately a large
number of people left [the company] and it spent over $400,000
recruiting new employees"50 and was hampered in finishing an im-
portant project.
Based on these facts as recited in plaintiff's opening statement,
the trial court granted defendant a nonsuit, finding that the contrac-
tual restriction was an unlawful restraint of trade and therefore un-
enforceable. The court of appeal reversed, asserting that no
California court had previously dealt with such a promise not to
43. Hays, The California Law of Unfair Competition Takes a Turn - Against the Em-
ployer, 41 CAL. L. R~v. 38, 61 (1953).
44. See supra note 19, at 1331.
45. See supra note 23.
46. See supra note 19, at 1332.
47. E.g., a trial court's decision to issue an injunction made available by the terms of the
Uniform Act is still subject to the "balance of equities" applicable to any injunction applica-
tion. In that context, the defendant former employee's intent to injure could well be a signifi-
cant factor in determining the availability of any meaningful remedy. In addition, such intent
is made expressly relevant to determinations under the Uniform Act concerning liability for
punitive damages and attorney's fees.
48. 174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985).
49. Id. at 274, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
50. Id.
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"disrupt" or "raid," which it characterized as a "non-interference
agreement." 51
The court cited State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Dempster 2 for the proposition that "an agreement between em-
ployer and employee defining a trade secret may not be decisive in
determining whether the Court will so regard it.""3 However, in
what appears to be a significant misreading of precedent, it stated
that "cases suggest that when permissible solicitation of an em-
ployer's customers is at issue, a contract may prohibit more than
the law of the marketplace otherwise would."54 In support, it cited
Continental Car-Na-Var Corporation v. Moseley" and quoted from
Aetna as follows:
In the absence of an enforceable contract containing negative
covenants to the contrary, equity will not enjoin a former em-
ployee from soliciting business from his former employer's cus-
tomers, provided his competition is fairly and legally
conducted. 56
From this authority the Loral court concluded that "contrac-
tual restrictions may have more impact in a non-solicitation case
than a nondisclosure case." 57
The Loral court therefore saw the question before it as
"whether a noninterference agreement not to solicit former co-
workers to leave the employer is more like a noncompetition agree-
ment which is invalid, or a nondisclosure or nonsolicitation agree-
ment which may be valid."5" In trying to answer that question, the
court considered the passage from Hollingsworth which stated that
California law would not permit parties to contract between them-
selves for greater restrictions than the law would impose in the ab-
sence of contract.5 9 However, it distinguished Hollingsworth on the
ground that the Ninth Circuit had applied its Business and Profes-
sions Code analysis only to "nonsolicitation and nondisclosure"
cases, while the contract before it involved "noninterference
promises."'
51. Id. at 275, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
52. 174 Cal. App. 2d 418, 344 P.2d 821 (1959).
53. Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 275, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
54. IM.
55. 24 Cal. 2d 104, 148 P.2d 9 (1944).
56. Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 275, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 276, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
59. See supra note 19.
60. Id. at 277, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
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Having thus disposed of Hollingsworth, the court turned to a
pair of Georgia cases, Lane Co. v. Taylor6" and Harrison v. Sara
Coventry, Inc.62 In both cases a proscription against "pirating" of
employees (by inducing them to leave) had been found to be reason-
able as necessary to protect the employer's interest. Following the
balancing or "reasonableness" approach applied by these cases, the
court observed that the agreement signed by Moyes appeared to be
no more restrictive than a ban on solicitation of customers or on
disclosure of confidential information.63
Continuing to employ a balance-of-interest analysis, the court
observed that the restriction under review only slightly affected the
interest of the "third party" employees of plaintiff who might be
interested in working with Moyes. "All they lose is the option of
being contacted by him first."" Restating the non-solicitation rule
of Aetna in terms of employees, the court emphasized that hiring,
without more, is protected activity: "Equity will not enjoin a for-
mer employee from receiving and considering applications from em-
ployees of his former employer, even though the circumstances be
such that he should be enjoined from soliciting their application."65
The opinion in Loral suffers from inadequate disclosure of sig-
nificant facts. No specific acts of "solicitation" were alleged, or at
least they do not appear in the opinion. In fact, all one can discern
from the opinion is that the defendant hired the employees in ques-
tion. Unless the court felt that an inference of solicitation was justi-
fied from the fact that a number of employees left quickly, it
appears only that the defendant engaged in activity (hiring) which
the court acknowledged is absolutely protected, just as the Aetna
court had acknowledged that employees were absolutely privileged
to accept business from their former employer's customers.
Indeed, close study of the opinion leads one to conclude that
the court may have been stretching to help the plaintiff overcome an
insufficient factual showing. It would have been easy enough sim-
ply to cite Hollingsworth for the proposition that contractual restric-
61. 174 Ga. App. 356, 330 S.E.2d 112 (1985).
62. 228 Ga. 169, 184 S.E.2d 448 (1971).
63. The court was careful to point out that its conclusion applied only to the facts of the
case before it. "We need not and do not decide whether this noninterference contract would
unreasonably and illegally restrain trade if applied to other conduct at another time." 174
Cal. App. 3d at 279, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
64. Id. at 279, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
65. Id.; Note that the plaintiff here did not pursue an argument based on Bancroft-
Whitney Co. v. Glen, supra note 16, that the "abilities and salaries of its employees were
trade secrets" a proposition which the Loral court nevertheless found to be "interesting."
174 Cal. App. 3d at 280, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 844, fn. 6.
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tions may go no further than the common law; and that the activity
complained of did not fall within common law proscriptions. How-
ever, keeping the plaintiff in court required finding a way around
Hollingsworth, by elevating the importance of the contract that
Moyes had signed. The reasoning followed by the court in getting
to that point is tortuous and unfairly characterizes earlier case law.
First, there is no indication in the Aetna or Continental opin-
ions that one may by contract prohibit conduct that is not pro-
scribed otherwise. In Aetna, for example, the "nonsolicitation"
contract was found by the trial court to be too ambiguous for en-
forcement, and the employer therefore relied on common law re-
strictions (apparently what the Loral court referred to as the "law
of the marketplace"). 6 Therefore, there can be no "suggestion" in-
ferred into Aetna that a contract can "prohibit more" than the com-
mon law. In fact, the contract in Aetna prohibited "serving" or
"catering to" customers, and the court held there that equity would
not restrain the receipt of business.
Therefore, if one were to speculate on what the Aetna court
would have said on the issue, it would have more likely reached a
conclusion opposite to that ascribed to it by the Loral court. This is
especially apparent when reading the dissent in Aetna, which fo-
cused on the contract as a document that, even if unenforceable for
vagueness, nevertheless "contained statements that constituted ad-
missions" of the defendant that the list of names and addresses of its
customers was an important asset of the plaintiff company.
Continental Car-Na-Var67 was also incorrectly characterized
by the Loral court. In fact, there was no restrictive covenant at
issue in the case. It was in the Continental Car-Na-Var opinion that
the Supreme Court had offered the quote about "contrary negative
covenants" which was picked up in Aetna, and eventually used in
Loral. The court in Continental Car-Na-Var stated:
[P]ublic policy and natural justice require that equity should also
be solicitious for the right inherent in all people, not fettered by
negative covenants upon their part to the contrary to follow any
of the common occupations of life.6
8
The similar language in Aetna read:
In the absence of an enforceable contract containing negative
covenants to the contrary, equity will not enjoin a former em-
ployee from soliciting business from his former employer's cus-
66. Id. at 275, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
67. See supra note 53.
68. Id. at 110, 148 P.2d at 12.
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tomers, provided his competition is fairly and legally
conducted.69
As noted earlier, it was from these authorities that the Loral
court concluded that "contractual restrictions may have more im-
pact in a nonsolicitation case than a nondisclosure case."70 How-
ever, this conclusion rested on an assumption that the "negative
covenants" referred to by the Continental and Aetna courts were
nonsolicitation covenants. In Continental, the phrase "negative
covenants" unmistakably refers to the right described immediately
thereafter "to follow any of the common occupations of life;" in
other words, a noncompetition covenant. Even in the slightly ex-
panded version appearing in Aetna, the most that can be said is that
the court referred to a contract (1) with a covenant prohibiting so-
licitation even where competition is otherwise "fairly and legally
conducted" and (2) which is "enforceable." Only a covenant re-
straining competition, enforceable under the exceptions provided in
Business and Professions Code §§ 16601 or 16602, meets these two
criteria.
Another necessary premise to the Loral court's dictum is that
there is a meaningful distinction between "nonsolicitation" and
"nondisclosure" agreements on the one hand, and "noninterfer-
ence" agreements on the other. Thus, the court formulated its cen-
tral inquiry as follows:
Our question then is whether a noninterference agreement not to
solicit former co-workers to leave the employer is more like a
noncompetition agreement which is invalid, or a nondisclosure
or nonsolicitation agreement which may be valid.7 '
The first fallacy is the court's assumption that a noncompeti-
tion agreement "is invalid." Strictly speaking, such agreements
"may be" invalid, since they also may be enforceable under the ex-
ceptions of Business and Professions Code §§ 16601 and 16602.
This is not so trivial a point as it might seem, since it is connected to
the court's misinterpretation of the Aetna passage concerning "neg-
ative covenants to the contrary."
The second problem with the court's approach is that there is
no analysis of why nondisclosure or nonsolicitation covenants are
more likely to be enforced than are noncompetition covenants. The
answer to that question - that the first two serve exclusively to
69. See supra note 15, at 203, 246 P.2d at 14.
70. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 275, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
71. Id. at 276, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
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protect trade secrets and fiduciary obligations - might have led the
court to a clear conclusion more consistent with the analysis of Hol-
lingsworth: that a nonsolicitation agreement may operate only to
prevent the use of confidential information in the solicitation of em-
ployees or customers, since any broader restriction would likely ex-
ceed the bounds of common law prohibitions on the ex-employee.
Moreover, recognizing the protection of confidential information as
the basis for nonsolicitation covenants would expose the lack of any
significant difference between such agreements and a covenant not
to "interfere."
A third failing of the court's opinion in this regard is that it did
not explain how in this context "noninterference" differs from
"nonsolicitation." In fact, the court's statement of the issue uses
the terms together in such a way as to blur any distinction that
might exist ("a noninterference agreement not to solicit"). If the
outcome of this case hinged on drawing a distinction between these
two terms, presenting the issue in this fashion was not particularly
useful.
Finally, the question was never answered by the court. In part
perhaps this is because the "more like" standard it chose was too
vague to begin with. Perhaps the reason was that to answer it
would have exposed the faulty logic behind its analysis. In any
event, there was nothing presented by the court that would explain
how for these purposes "noninterference" is any different than
"nonsolicitation."
As noted earlier, a necessary step in the court's reasoning was
to distinguish Hollingsworth, since its language on the effect of con-
tract would have disposed of the issue in a different way. However,
the court's attempt to avoid Hollingsworth fell short of the mark. It
is not precisely true that the "interference" ruling of the Hollings-
worth court was not concerned with the Business and Professions
Code. What that court did say was that (1) interference with cus-
tomers or employees is not actionable unless some trade secret vio-
lation is involved, and (2) a contract against solicitation of
customers would violate the statute if construed beyond the pro-
scriptions of common law.
The other argument employed by the Loral court in distin-
guishing Hollingsworth is that it focused on a nonsolicitation cove-
nant, as opposed to one which specified a promise not to
"interfere."
The court applied the statute to promises of nonsolicitation and
nondisclosure as the California state courts have done, and the
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case goes no further than that. It does not apply the statute to
any noninteference promises.7"
Of course, Loral's suggestion - not necessary to the result in the
case - that a "noninterference covenant" somehow can expand the
scope of employee restrictions that are otherwise imposed by law -
rests on the premise that there is a meaningful difference in the term
"interference" as compared to "solicitation." As we have seen
above, it never explained or justified such a distinction, and none
appears in the Hollingsworth opinion. Indeed, the Hollingsworth
court seemed to use the terms interchangeably.73
Nor do the Georgia cases relied on by the Loral court support
its position on the supposed distinction between the terms. In fact,
neither case treats a "noninterference" clause as such.
Lane Co. v. Taylor74 arose on review of a trial court's grant of
summary judgment to an employee subject to a variety of restrictive
covenants. The lower court had held the entire contract void be-
cause it contained no territorial limitations. The appellate court re-
versed, holding that this deficiency voided only the customer
solicitation provision.
Loral refers to Lane as dealing with covenants against "pirat-
ing." In fact, the contract went much further. The employee prom-
ised for a year after termination not to "hire or attempt to hire for
any other employer any employee of Employer or directly or indi-
rectly cause any such employee to leave his employment in order to
work for another." Such a restriction against hiring was acknowl-
edged by the Loral court to be unlawful in California.75 Moreover,
the term "interfere" was not used at all in the contract.
Apart from the fact that Lane addressed a body of law signifi-
cantly different from California's, the Loral court mischaracterized
its holding when it reported that the Lane court found that "the
limited restriction on 'pirating' of employees was reasonable and
'needed to protect legitimate business interests.' "76
In the first place, the restriction was not "limited," but in effect
extended to the simple act of hiring, whether or not there was solici-
tation. Second, and more important, the Loral court's characteriza-
tion gives the clear impression that the Georgia appellate court was
giving its imprimatur to the enforcement of such restrictions in gen-
72. Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
73. See Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, supra note 19, at 1337.
74. See supra note 58.
75. Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
76. Id.
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eral, as "needed to protect legitimate business interests." However,
the Lane court simply reversed a summary judgment ruling, noting
that under Georgia law there was a litigable question of fact
whether the restriction was necessary.
The language of this subparagraph is circumscribed by a one
year limitation, and it restricts only the actions of the property
manager. The covenant is not too broad in its scope to sustain a
finding that it was needed to protect legitimate business
interests.77
Harrison v. Sarah Coventry7 I also is not quite what the Loral
court said it was. In that case, the court dealt with an appeal from
an order granting a preliminary injunction and denying a motion to
dismiss, where the defendants, as in Lane, had argued that the re-
strictive covenant lacked territorial limitations. The court there
held that Georgia law did not require such limitations if the em-
ployee was free to compete, and found that the restriction against
solicitation of employees satisfied that requirement.
Significantly, the agreement itself did not mention "interfer-
ence." The employee agreed not to "on his/her behalf or on the
behalf of any other person or company, solicit or in any manner
attempt to induce Sarah Coventry's salespeople or employees to
leave the company." As in Lane, the term "interference" arose
only as a characterization by the court of the agreement:
They agreed by their contract not to interfere with the contrac-
tual relationships of the plaintiff and its other employees...
The Loral court concluded by noting its agreement "with the
reasoning of the Georgia courts. The potential impact on trade
must be considered before invalidating a noninterference agree-
ment." 0 However, neither of the Georgia cases distinguished a
"noninterference" covenant as such; each was concerned only with
distinguishing between a noncompetition covenant on the one hand
and nonsolicitation or nondisclosure agreements on the other. As
the court explained in Harrison:
The defendants contend that the employment contract was void
as being in restraint of trade, because the contract, though rea-
sonable as to the time following the term of employment, was
unreasonable and void because it was not limited as to territory
... These authorities have no application to the instant case, as
77. See supra note 58, at 330 S.E.2d at 117.
78. See supra note 59.
79. Id. at 184 S.E.2d at 449.
80. Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 279, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
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those cases involved contracts wherein the employee agreed that,
after the termination of his employment, he would not be em-
ployed or engage in a business in competition with his former
employer. In the instant case the defendants were free to enter
into the employment of a competitor of the plaintiff after the ter-
mination of their employment by the plaintiff.81
Having concluded that its mission was simply to examine the
reasonableness of the restraint on Moyes, the Loral court found that
his contract, judged by that standard, was enforceable.
Defendant is restrained from disrupting, damaging, impairing or
interfering with his former employer by raiding [its] employees
under his termination agreement. This does not appear to be any
more of a significant restraint on his engaging in his profession,
trade or business than a restraint on solicitation of customers or
on disclosure of confidential information. 2
This is true enough, but besides working against the wrong
standard, it disproves the logic on which the court's opinion is
based. If the reason that Hollingsworth is not controlling is that
there is a meaningful distinction concerning "noninterference" cov-
enants, the court in the last-quoted excerpt determined that that
premise is incorrect; therefore, Hollingsworth should control. The
irony is that one cannot tell from this opinion whether it would
have made a difference. Judged under the standards enunciated in
Hollingsworth and as applied to nonsolicitation covenants, the real
issue is whether the plaintiff had any evidence from which it could
be inferred that Moyes had solicited the employees, as opposed
merely to accepting applications from them. If such evidence did
exist, then the result was correct and the motion for directed verdict
should not have been granted. Either way, the court's excursion
into the interpretation and relative merits of California and Georgia
law was unnecessary. Because it could be misleading as well, it
should not be relied on.
D. John F. Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier83
Matull involved an appeal from the grant of a preliminary in-
junction against an attorney who also acted as a labor relations con-
sultant. She had first worked in that capacity for Gund, then joined
Matuli as an officer and shareholder. Gund later sold Matull its
accounts and retained it to service them. The agreement, which re-
81. See supra note 59, at 184 S.E.2d at 449.
82. Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 279, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
83. 194 Cal. App. 3d 1049, 240 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1987).
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quired that Matull's officers and shareholders join as signatories,
provided that for a period of five years none would "divert, take
away, solicit or attempt to divert, take away or solicit" any of the
existing or new accounts.8 4
After Cloutier left Matull, it sought and received an injunction
prohibiting her from "dealing" with its customers "in any capacity
related to [its] business, namely industrial and labor relations,"
from using its customer list in any way, and from competing with it
or "distributing any information from files and/or documents" re-
lated to its customers unless of a "legal nature unrelated to ... labor
relations ...."85 The appellate court found the injunction to be
deficient as phrased:
The language of the injunction is vague and ambiguous and over-
broad in several respects. It would keep appellant from using
respondent's customer lists, even for legitimate, noncompetitive
purposes, including that of informing her legal clients about her
change in employment or the fact that she was no longer repre-
senting them. It is not solicitation to tell clients of one's former
employer about a change in jobs [citation to Moss, Adams] and
an attorney clearly has an ethical duty to inform her clients that
she is withdrawing her legal services. [citation]. 86
But applying a sort of "blue pencil rule" to the injunction, the
court narrowed it to the bounds of common law restrictions, and as
restricted, affirmed it.
We do not, however, question the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a restraint on appellant's solicitation of traditional labor
relations consulting business from [Matull's] customers. With
respect to such solicitations, the injunction would be appropriate
as to all activities of a labor relations consultant, except for those
which can only be performed by an attorney licensed to practice
law in California.8 7
Unfortunately, the opinion does not disclose in any detail what
was the "evidence" that the court found to be sufficient. However,
it is significant that the court for this purpose relied on the evidence
of the employee's conduct, and not on the provisions of the con-
tract, to justify imposing the restrictions.
Nevertheless, the Matull court did include a statement in its
84. Id at 1052, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
85. Id at 1053, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
86. Id at 1056, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
87. Id.
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opinion which appears to be in conflict with the Hollingsworth rule,
and therefore deserves further analysis:
[R]espondent had a right to protect against appellant trying to
obtain the labor relations clients for herself through active solici-
tation should she grow dissatisfied with her association with
respondent. 88
Did the court mean to say that a nonsolicitation covenant is
enforceable even where no trade secret might be used or fiduciary
obligations breached? Such a proposition would be contrary to the
language of Hollingsworth, which by this time had been expressly
approved by the court of appeal in Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling.89
In analyzing the authorities relied on by Matull and tracing them to
their sources, we shall see that the Matull opinion should not be
read as supporting this proposition, and that the Hollingsworth/
Moss, Adams statement reflects the well-reasoned California rule:
that nonsolicitation covenants may not be enforced except to the
extent necessary to protect the integrity of a former employer's con-
fidential information.90
One case relied on by Matull was Loral. However, it cannot be
confirmed from the Loral opinion whether there was improper so-
licitation (in the sense of misuse of trade secrets) because the plain-
tiff abandoned its assertions in that regard at the trial court level. 91
Matull also relied on dictum from Golden State Linen Service
v. Vidalin,92 where the court of appeal addressed an employee
agreement containing a nonsolicitation clause.
Part (3) appears to be valid and enforceable insofar as it provides
that the affected employee will not solicit Golden State's custom-
ers after leaving its employ. [citations] As we have concluded
above, however, we are bound by the trial court's factual deter-
nuination that none of the respondents.., did this.93
By the Golden State Linen court's own admission, this passage is
simply dictum; because the defendants were found not to have com-
mitted any acts of solicitation, the proper interpretation and scope
of the prohibition was a moot issue. Moreover, the statement is
substantially hedged by use of the word "appears."
88. Id at 1055, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
89. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
90. Such an examination also illustrates the wisdom of the conventions against using
dictum in opinions and relying on it later as black letter law.
91. See supra note 62.
92. 69 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1977).
93. Id at 9, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
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Examining the authorities cited in Golden State Linen Service,
we find no direct support for the suggestion that any restrictions on
solicitation will be enforceable. We turn first to Gordon v. Lan-
dau.94 In that case the trial court had held unenforceable as an
unlawful restraint of trade a restrictive covenant which required the
employee to maintain as confidential the names and addresses of
customers of a house-to-house installment sales business, and not to
solicit them for a period of one year after termination of employ-
ment. Significantly, the customers were "housewives in the low-in-
come bracket" who had been identified after extensive canvassing as
willing to purchase merchandise at home and pay some installments
on a weekly basis. Thus, the customer population was like that in
California Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham,95 resulting in a "list
of subscribers of a service, built up by ingenuity, time, labor and
expense of the owner over a period of many years," knowledge of
which "may not be used by the employee as his own property. '96
Here the defendant had after termination "methodically vis-
ited" the customers whom he had called on for plaintiff and solic-
ited their business, securing 117 accounts. He used "the knowledge
which he had acquired from plaintiffs' customer cards," which in-
cluded not only the customer's name and address, but an account-
ing of previous purchases and payment history. Under these
circumstances, the Supreme Court interpreted the contract as one
not to use confidential information to solicit the former employer's
customers.
It clearly appears from the terms of the contract that it did not
prevent defendant from carrying on a weekly credit business or
any other business. He merely agreed not to use plaintiffs' confi-
dential lists to solicit customers for himself for a period of one
year following termination of his employment. Such an agree-
ment is valid and enforceable. [Citations].97
For this proposition, Gordon v. Landau relied on three earlier
cases: Gordon v. Wasserman,98 Handyspot v. Buegeleisen,99 and
94. 49 Cal. 2d 690, 321 P.2d 456 (1958).
95. 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 188 P.2d 303 (1948).
96. Id. at 203, 188 P.2d at 306.
97. It is also useful to note that the underlying opinion of the court of appeal, which
was affirmed but vacated as a result of the Supreme Court opinion, stated that the contract in
question gave "plaintiffs no rights that they did not already have in equity."
98. 153 Cal. App. 2d 328, 314 P.2d 759 (1957). The plaintiff was the same as in Lan-
dau, as well as in the later case of Gordon v. Schwartz, 147 Cal. App. 2d 213, 305 P.2d 117
(1956), which affirmed an injunction against the same sort of solicitation based on "knowl-
edge which [the defendant] had acquired from the plaintiff's customer cards."
99. 128 Cal. App. 2d 191, 274 P.2d 938 (1954).
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King v. Gerold."°
Gordon v. Wasserman, affirmed a judgment against an em-
ployee involving a contract identical to that which would later be
considered by the Supreme Court in Gordon v. Landau. On the
brief facts recited in the opinion, it is clear that the defendant there
also used the customer cards in his solicitation of the customers.
The opinion similarly refers to the contract in question as one "not
to use plaintiffs' confidential list to solicit customers," and relies on
the King and Handyspot opinions later cited in Gordon v. Landau.
Handyspot v. Buegeleisen did not address the issue in question.
That case involved an agreement not to solicit which was part of a
valid sale of a business. The defendant had argued that he did not
in fact sell the goodwill of the business, but the trial court found
otherwise. Whether solicitation could be restricted absent
threatened misuse of confidential information was not considered.
Similarly, King v. Gerold provides no support for the proposi-
tion that a nonsolicitation covenant may be enforced absent trade
secret misappropriation. Indeed, that case involved no issues re-
garding customer solicitation. The licensee of a unique trailer de-
sign had promised to stop manufacturing it after the license
terminated. When it continued to manufacture after termination,
the licensor sued, and the licensee defended on the basis that Busi-
ness and Professions Code § 16600 operated to void the restrictive
provision. Rejecting that argument, the court pointed out that the
licensee was free to manufacture any trailers except those based on
the design that had been licensed from the plaintiff.
The other opinion relied on in Golden State Linen was Weis-
sensee v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 1 1 which dealt with a dealer's
obligation to return a customer list to the newspaper, and had cited
Gordon v. Landau for a different proposition, that a "reasonable
agreement not to use confidential lists is valid and enforceable.""0 2
No issue was presented concerning enforceability of nonsolicitation
covenants absent misuse of confidential information.
E. Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling0 3
Defendants Shilling and Kenyon were employee-managers of
an accounting firm. In anticipation of their resignation, they pre-
100. 109 Cal. App. 2d 316, 240 P.2d 710 (1952).
101. 59 Cal. App. 3d 723, 129 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1976).
102. Id. at 728, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
103. 179 Cal. App. 3d 124, 274 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986). The author was counsel for the
defendants.
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pared simple announcements of their new firm and its location.
They removed their employer's "Rolodex" list of client names and
addresses from their office for one evening, in order to address an-
nouncements to the approximately 100 clients with whom they had
had personal contact as professionals. After termination, they
mailed the announcements, and a number of the Moss, Adams cli-
ents retained their new firm.
Shilling and Kenyon had signed agreements with Moss, Adams
that stipulated that the names and addresses of the clients were
trade secrets, and that as employees they could not divulge that in-
formation or solicit those clients for a year after termination. Fol-
lowing the mailing, Moss, Adams sought injunctive relief, and
eventually defendants moved for summary adjudication. They ar-
gued that the primary action complained of - mailing the an-
nouncements - was protected by pronouncements in Continental
Car-Na- Var Corp. v. Moseley"° and Aetna Building Maintenance
Co. v. West,"05 to the effect that such action did not constitute "so-
licitation." Since the activity had been deemed by the courts to be
fair competition, they argued, it could not be prohibited by con-
tract. Their motion was granted, and the remaining allegations of
unfair competition eventually were tried, resulting in a judgment in
their favor. Moss, Adams appealed from the grant of summary ad-
judication, arguing that the record presented questions of fact re-
garding whether its customer list was a trade secret, the use of
which could be properly prohibited.
The court of appeal confirmed that the mailing of the an-
nouncement did not constitute "solicitation," and that the contract
which sought to restrict use of the customer list was unenforceable
because the list was not, as a matter of law, a trade secret.
On the first point, the court relied on the holdings in Aetna and
Continental Car-Na-Var, but noted that "[i]n both decisions our
Supreme Court also held that information used in those cases to
announce a change in employment did not constitute trade
secrets."10 6 The court also declared that no California case had ad-
dressed the question of whether a former employee "can use trade
secrets to announce a change in employement." °7 Nevertheless, it
concluded from the Aetna opinion that misuse might be found in
some use of trade secrets other than solicitation, and therefore that
104. See supra note 53.
105. See supra note 15.
106. Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 127, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
107. Id. at 128, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
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the inquiry must extend to whether defendants made "some other
unlawful use of a trade secret to facilitate announcing their changes
of employment." 10
Whether something qualifies as a trade secret, the court ex-
plained, is normally a question of fact. 109 However, the only use of
the list here was to identify clients whose names the defendants al-
ready knew from their professional association with them. The
court concluded that these names alone could not be trade
secrets. 110 This situation was contrasted with cases such as Kia-
math-Orleans Lumber, Inc. v. Miller,111 in which the former em-
ployees had solicited a "select" list of highly profitable clients with
whom they had not enjoyed personal dealings.
Under the rule of Avocado Sales and Theodore, the names of
Moss, Adams' clients serviced by Shilling and Kenyon during
the year preceding their resignations were not trade secrets, be-
cause the clients became known through personal contact and
provision of accounting services. Shilling and Kenyon could not
be compelled to "wipe clean the slate of their memories." The
names of other Moss, Adams' clients may have remained trade
secrets, but Shilling and Kenyon did not record the names or
addresses of those clients or mail announcements to them.1 12
Since the names were not trade secrets, the court held, the ad-
dresses could not be, because they were easily discoverable in a local
telephone directory.1 13
Finally, the court held that the contracts could not save the
employer's claim.
[B]ecause there was no use of trade secrets, the use of the rolodex
was not actionable under the employment agreements. An-
tisolicitation covenants are void as unlawful business restraints
except where their enforcement is necessary to protect trade
secrets. [citations] Stated another way, "the applicable Califor-
nia law is that 'the employer will be able to restrain by contract
only that conduct of the former employee that would have been
subject to judicial restraint under the law of unfair competition,
absent the contract.'" [Citations].1 14
108. Id
109. Id.
110. Id See Avocado Sales Co. v. Wyse, 122 Cal. App. 627, 10 P.2d 485 (1932); Theo-
dore v. Williams, 44 Cal. App. 34, 185 P. 1014 (1919).
111. 87 Cal. App. 3d 458, 151 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1978).
112. Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 129, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 959.
113. IL
114. Id at 130, 224 Cal. Rptr. 459; see also CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering
1976); Gordon Termite Control v. Terrones, 84 Cal. App. 3d 176, 148 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1978);
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The last point made by the court in Moss, Adams was certainly
correct, and consistent with the policy underlying California's ap-
proach to restrictive covenants. However, it was unfortunate that
the court sought to justify the defendants' conduct on the basis that
they knew the customers' names. Neither Theodore v. Williams nor
Avocado Sales Co. v. Wyse supports the proposition that information
which might otherwise be protectable loses that status when it is
carried in an employee's head.
Theodore v. Williams" 5 dealt with a laundry's ex-employee
who had been enjoined from soliciting his former employer's cus-
tomers. On an application for contempt, the court held that it was
not a violation of that injunction for the defendant to drive his
wagon along his old route, simply displaying the name and address
of his new employer. In Avocado Sales Co. v. Wyse,116 the court
affirmed a judgment in favor of the defendant employees who were
accused of selling avocados to the same customers served by their
ex-employer. The court there concluded from the evidence that the
identity and location of the customers could not be a trade secret,
but not because the former employees were familiar with those cus-
tomers. Rather, the justification was that potential purchasers of
avocados were readily identifiable to anyone as the "higher class...
hotels, cafes, and clubs" in the area.
The problem with the rationale of the Moss, Adams court is
that it is open to attack by those who view trade secrets as a species
of "property." For example, the court's articulated distinction of
the Klamath line of cases is that using one's memory to solicit a
subset of clients that is "select" is not fair and therefore enjoin-
able." 7 In distinguishing Klamath, then, the court shifts from a
"what is a trade secret" mode of analysis to a "how is the informa-
tion gathered and used" inquiry. In fact, focusing on the relative
fairness of the defendants' conduct is what it should have done in
the first place. That would have provided better direction for other
courts dealing with similar problems in the future.
The central question is: Why is it different - in terms of fair-
ness - to allow Shilling and Kenyon to use the customer names
and not permit the Klamath employees to do so? To say that Shil-
Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, supra note 19; Hays, The California Law of
Unfair Competition Takes a Turn - Against the Employer, supra note 41, at 69.
115. See supra note 106.
116. Id.
117. The court also pointed to the fact that the Klamath defendants did not have a per-
sonal relationship with the clients in question, but Klamath is the only "select list" case in
which that appears as a factual distinction.
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ling and Kenyon already knew them because of their personal rela-
tionship is to invite evasion by other employees who may be guided
by the enunciated rule. Instead, the court could have distinguished
the case before it on the ground that the employees there could not
otherwise have achieved the competitively legitimate objective of
giving notice to a class of third parties - those customers with
whom they had had some direct working relationship - who might
care about it. Making the third party interest the distinguishing
feature has a number of advantages, not the least of which is that it
solves the problem of how the rule is to be applied to clerical and
other employees as to whom the employer has had no opportunity
to regulate client exposure (and therefore its risk of loss of the client
when the employee leaves).
The Moss, Adams court missed an opportunity to treat the is-
sue in the larger context of defining trade secrets as a class or bun-
dle of balanced rights. The court might have noted that the term
"trade secret" is not a talisman, that the focus is as much on con-
duct as on determination of property interest, and that some "use"
is "fair" in certain circumstances while not in others, as to the same
"property." This approach would recognize that the concepts of
unfair competition and trade secrets are not rigid and hidebound by
the law applicable to other forms of property.
The word "property" as applied to trade marks and trade secrets
is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of
the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary require-
ments of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable
trade secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they
are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property
may be denied, but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the
starting point for the present matter is not property or due pro-
cess of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations
with the plaintiffs ... 118
Stated another way, the law of unfair competition is meant to
protect the confidence placed in an employee by erecting certain
restrictions on post-termination activity. The common law ap-
proach represent a balance between the interest of the employer in
the confidence and the interest of the employee (and of the general
public or third party customers) in free competition. It is inappro-
priate in that context to adopt a rule that the label "trade secret,"
applied to a customer list for some purposes, necessarily applies for
all purposes. In the Moss, Adams case, for example, the issue was
118. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
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not the entire bundle of sticks, but only the twig that defendants
used when they mailed their announcements. If it is the judgment
of a court that "fair" competition requires that the employee be able
to use a customer list for this single, limited purpose, the "trade
secret" interest of the employer is not thereby destroyed. Instead, it
is defined as subject to a competing interest. The result might be
based on a balancing of the employee's right to seek continued em-
ployment or filfill his professional obligations, on the client's right
to know where their professional representatives are located, on the
court's determination that use of the list was so limited as to be de
minimus, or all of these.
One need only review California's statutes and regulations ap-
plying to trade secret matters, to conclude that the "property inter-
est" in trade secrets is far from absolute. For example, Government
Code § 6254.2 affirms the rights of agricultural workers to learn the
nature of the chemicals to which they are exposed in the fields. 119
Because the statute requires that the disclosee undertake not to fur-
ther disclose the information or use it for any unlawful purpose, the
employer's other competitive interests are protected. Similarly,
Health and Safety Code § 25511, regulating the use and storage of
hazardous materials, permits access to trade secret information by
interested persons who are subject to restrictions. 120
The alternative approach can lead to absurd results: property is
either sacred or up for grabs, but nothing in between. Courts will
strain at the logical bit to characterize the evidence in one way or
the other, to square their findings concerning the existence of a
trade secret with their informed judgment about what is a fair re-
sult, balancing the legitimate interests that compete for it.
III. SYNTHESIZING A RULE THAT MAKES SENSE
Given the amorphous nature of trade secrets and the strong
California policy supporting an employee's right to use learned
skills in subsequent employment, it is exceedingly difficult to draw a
line between an employer's enforceable proprietary rights and the
employee's general knowledge and skills. Yet that line drawing is at
the heart of most cases in which the employer's remedies rest on
claims of trade secret misappropriation. It is therefore no surprise
that employers will try to find contractual means to avoid this
problem.
119. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254.2 (Deering 1985).
120. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25511 (Deering 1985).
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As to noncompetition covenants, we should employ a method
of analysis which assures that the statutory policy assumptions are
met. These include the concept that the exception to the prohibi-
tion of Business and Professions Code § 16600 should apply only to
one who is a true "owner" of the business, in the sense that he has
some power to influence the terms of a sale of the business. Recog-
nizing that a minority stock position may afford little actual control
over the company's affairs, we ought to be suspect of a plaintiff's
showing that is limited to the sale of a relatively small ownership
position. Certainly where there is only nominal ownership in-
volved, it should be coupled with significant control and discretion,
in order to justify applying the exception codified in § 16601.
Regarding the more widely-used nondisclosure and nonsolici-
tation agreements, we should start by disregarding the unnecessary
or incorrect language of Loral, Matull and Moss, Adams, and recog-
nize the combined property and confidential relations aspects of
trade secret law. Decisions in this field should be reached with a
steady eye on the goal of fair competition, which derives from a
careful balancing of legitimate interests of the litigating as well as
absent parties. This should not mean that we cannot employ rules
to guide us in this task and we will suggest some here that reflect a
fair synthesis of the decisions to date.
Accepting the wisdom of a rule which generally voids private
restrictions broader in scope than otherwise would be imposed by
law, we should nevertheless recognize the value of an employment
contract in helping to resolve the difficult factual issues that so often
determine the resolution of trade secret cases. Therefore, a restric-
tive contract, even if it is not enforceable in all its terms, ought to be
received as rebuttable proof of, for example, (1) the employer's rea-
sonable efforts to protect its confidential information, (2) the exist-
ence of confidential information which has value, (3) notice to the
employee of what the employer claims, and (4) exposure of the em-
ployee to the employer's confidential information.
The presumption created by such contracts should vary in
strength with the circumstances and context in which the agree-
ment was signed. For example, for what issue is the contract
presented as proof? It will be considered as nearly conclusive on the
issue of notice to the employee, but of much lesser value on the
question of the existence of a protectable trade secret. Its better
proof available? Was the agreement signed under circumstances
where there was an opportunity to bargain? How specific are the
recitals?
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In summary, a nonsolicitation covenant (whether appearing in
that form or as a covenant not to "interfere") should be enforced
only to the extent that the act complained of would be actionable as
misappropriation of trade secrets or breach of some other duty of
the employee. While Business and Professions Code § 16600 does
not invalidate such contracts, they should be interpreted consist-
ently with this principle. This does not mean that restrictive cove-
nants are valueless as a mere redundancy. To the contrary,
properly crafted they are an excellent means to achieve clear com-
munication about each party's expectations, a circumstance which
all will agree is the most significant step in avoiding litigation.

